


TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 7-7-87
TO: <i>ECS Registry</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>All cys. going out are to be hand delivered. Receipts will be obtained.</i>		
FROM: <i>Donna CCISCMO</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

~~SECRET~~

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
 INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505



DCI/ICS 0896-87

6 JUL 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM:



Chairman

Encls 19-SR 25X1

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Guidance (U)

1. The Interagency Group for Countermeasures Policy [IG/CM(P)], a subelement of the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence, has recently been deliberating on a significant physical security issue as outlined in paragraph two below. A number of actions resulting from those deliberations may cause further inquiry from the media. Accordingly, the IG/CM(P) has developed public affairs guidance for use as required (Attachment 1). Consistent with paragraph four below, the guidance is provided specifically for action by the GSA Public Affairs Office and for the information of all other addressees. (U)

2. The Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE), chaired by the General Services Administration (GSA), sponsored a study on the manipulation resistance of GSA-approved, three-position combination locks. Three independent contractors tested such combination locks manufactured by Mosler, LaGard, and Sargent and Greenleaf. The results of the tests showed that recent advances in technology could be used to defeat these combination locks surreptitiously, effectively reducing the degree of lock protection provided. The current GSA standard requires hours of delay against manipulation. The use of computers and other technically enhanced manipulation techniques permitted penetration within hours. (C)

25X1

25X1

3. The attached public affairs guidance is to be used in responding to queries that may arise in regard to questions pertaining to US security equipment. It is anticipated that questions may stem from an expected announcement in the Federal Register indicating a change in ISOO Directive #1 concerning national security (Attachment 2), or anticipated GSA discussions with lock manufacturer representatives on reviewing the possible need to enhance the current three-position combination locking system presently used by all government agencies. (C)

Regrade Confidential when
 separated from Secret attachment

CL BY D/ISOO
 DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Guidance (U)

4. The GSA has agreed to respond for the government to any public inquiries regarding the subject matter in the above paragraph. Therefore, it is requested that all such inquiries be referred to the GSA Public Affairs Office. (U)



25X1

Attachments:
a/s

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 1PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

The following public affairs guidance is for use in a response on a query basis only to questions pertaining to changes to ISOO Directive #1 on national security information. This will shortly appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. Federal Agencies and the DoD will refer questions on the directive to public affairs in the appropriate Federal Agency.

DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE

Recent reviews by interagency committees responsible for security equipment have found that physical security programs have not in all cases kept pace with improvements in technology. These improvements include both the technology available to adversaries, whether terrorists or hostile intelligence services, and protective systems used to prevent or deter operations against Federal Government assets. A coordinated effort is underway to update and upgrade security standards and practices in general. As research and development efforts reach fruition and analyses of incidents are completed, you will see evidence of improvements. New policies, procedures, and equipment specifications will change the way we protect personnel, equipment, and information. The recent change to the Information Security Oversight Office Directive #1 is one of many examples within the Government. We are attempting to apply new technology in a cost-effective manner to reduce risks to national assets.

UNTIL APPROVED FOR DISSEMINATION
THIS PRESS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CLASSIFIED--SECRET

SECRET

25X1

~~SECRET~~

1. Q: You mentioned the change to the security directive in the CFR, give us some other examples?
A: We plan to update testing standards and change Federal Specifications for security containers and combination locks, for example.
2. Q: Is this related to any of the on-going espionage investigations?
A: No, these efforts preceded the recent publicity; however, this has provided justification for increased attention in this area.
3. Q: Why can't this process be accelerated?
A: We are operating under fiscal constraints, which allow only a limited number of upgrades to be completed annually.

UNTIL APPROVED FOR DISSEMINATION
THIS PRESS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CLASSIFIED--SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~DECL:OADR~~

Attachment 2



Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, DC 20405

July 6, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Grant S. Green, Jr.
Staff Secretary, National Security Council

FROM: Steven Garfinkel *Steven Garfinkel*
Director, Information Security Oversight Office

SUBJECT: Proposed change to ISOO Directive No. 1

Under Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is required to receive the approval of the National Security Council (NSC) before issuing or amending an ISOO directive that impacts on all agencies that create or handle classified information. With the concurrence of the member agencies of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy) and the Director of Central Intelligence, ISOO proposes to amend § 2001.43 of its Directive No. 1 (32 CFR Part 2001) to enhance the minimum safeguarding requirement for TOP SECRET information that is stored outside the United States. David Major of the NSC staff is familiar with the factors that have led us to conclude that an enhancement is necessary at this time. We enclose the pertinent portion of the proposed section, with the new language underlined, as an appendix to this memorandum. As soon as we have received the NSC's concurrence, we will proceed with its effectuation through publication in the Federal Register.

Enclosure

APPENDIX: Proposed Change to ISOO Directive No. 1

§ 2001.43 Storage

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(a) Minimum requirements for physical barriers.
(1) Top Secret. Top Secret information shall be stored in a GSA-approved security container with an approved, built-in, three-position, dial-type changeable combination lock; in a vault protected by an alarm system and response force; or in other types of storage facilities that meet the standards for Top Secret established under the provisions of § 2001.41. For Top Secret information stored outside the United States, one or more of the following supplementary controls is required:
(i) the area that houses the security container or vault shall be subject to the continuous protection of guard or duty personnel; (ii) guard or duty personnel shall inspect the security container or vault at least once every two hours; or (iii) the security container or vault shall be controlled by an alarm system to which a force will respond in person within 15 minutes. In addition, heads of agencies shall prescribe those supplementary controls deemed necessary to restrict unauthorized access to areas in which such information is stored.

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Guidance

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CCISCMO/ICS (6 July 1987)

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Distribution of DCI/ICS 0896-87 (w/atts)

- 1 - Hon Robert B. Sims, AsstSecDef(Public Affairs)/DoD
- 1 -
- 1 - Charles Redman, AsstSec for Public Affairs, State
- 1 - Paul Costello, D/PAO, GSA
- 1 - Steven Garfinkel, D/IS00
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - IG/CM(P) chrono
- 1 - IG/CM(P) subject

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